This study reports the comprehensive result of a laboratory experiment where
subjects performed a problem-solving task under two types of incentive schemes;
tournament and quota. Additionally, all subjects evaluated attractiveness of the task
that they are perceived prior to learning how they would be compensated during the
experiment. Data are collected through 2 x 2 between-subject experiment which
treatment are given to incentive schemes and task attractiveness variables. Data of
this experiment were analyzed with various statistical instruments such as T-Test and
ANOVA. The result shown a difference in between-subject average individual
performance for each incentive scheme applied in this experiment regarding of task
attractiveness factor, thus proved that task attractiveness factor has causing main
effect to individual performance. Furthermore, it is shown that when the task was
initially perceived as being attractive, subjects under tournament incentive scheme
will outperform subjects under quota incentive scheme. Conversely, when the task
was initially perceived as being unattractive, subjects under quota incentive scheme
will outperform subjects under tournament incentive scheme in terms of individual
performance.
Keywords: individual
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