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KEDUDUKAN DAN KEWENANGAN KOMISI YUDISIAL DI BEBERAPA NEGARA EROPA (IRLANDIA, PERANCIS DAN ITALIA) Suprapto, Suprapto
Syiar Hukum Vol 14, No 1 (2012): Syiar Hukum
Publisher : LPPM Unisba

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Salah satu alasan didirikannya Komisi Yudisial di Negara Eropa adalah untuk membangkitkan kembali kepercayaan publik terhadap dunia peradilan dan menjadi lembaga negara yang menjadi penghubung antara kekuasaan pemerintah (executive power) dalam hal ini Departemen Kehakiman dengan kekuasaan kehakiman (judicial power). Sampai saat ini sudah 27 negara di Eropa yang mempunyai lembaga negara sejenis Komisi Yudisial. Komisi Yudisial di Irlandia disebut dengan Courts Service, di Perancis disebut Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature dan di Italia disebut dengan Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura. Komisi Yudisial di Eropa Utara yang diwakili oleh Irlandia memiliki tanggung jawab dan kewenangan pada area kebijakan teknis dan pembuatan kebijakan pada bidang peradilan. Sedangkan Komisi Yudisial di Eropa Selatan yang diwakili oleh Perancis dan Italia memiliki kewenangan dalam hal penentuan karir, rekruitmen hakim, pendidikan dan training hakim, mutasi dan promosi hakim serta penegakan disiplin.

PEMISAHAN KEKUASAAN, KONSTITUSI DAN KEKUASAAN KEHAKIMAN YANG INDEPENDEN MENURUT ISLAM Suparto, Suparto
Jurnal Selat Vol 4 No 1 (2016): JURNAL SELAT
Publisher : Program Studi Ilmu Hukum Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji

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Separations of Powers theory had just been developed by John Locke and Montesquieu circa 17 A.C. Theory of Constitution had also just been emerged circa 18 A.C., even though in Old Greece many people had already discussed about this theory, when Rasulullah SAW rule Madinah and Madinah Constitution circa A.C..At that time Islam has also implemented independent and unbiased judicature. Keywords: Separations of Powers, Constitution, Judicature   Teori Pemisahan Kekuasaan yang dikembangkan oleh John Locke dan Montesquieu baru muncul sekitar abad ke 17 dan 18. Sedangkan Islam sendiri telah mengenal adanya Pemisahan Kekuasaan dan Konstitusi jauh sebelum dunia barat (eropa) mempopulerkannya, yaitu pada masa pemerintahan Rosulullah Muhammad SAW di Negara Madinah. Islampun juga telah menerapkan adanya peradilan yang independen, bebas dan tidak memihak. Kata kunci: Pemisahan Kekuasaan, Konstitusi, Peradilan

Analisis terhadap Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 05/PUU-IV/2006 tentang Pengujian Undang Undang Nomor 22 Tahun 2004 tentang Komisi Yudisial Suparto, Suparto
Pagaruyuang Law Journal VOLUME 2 NOMOR 2, JANUARY 2019
Publisher : Universitas Muhammadiyah Sumatera Barat

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Amendment of the 1945 Constitution gave birth to a new state institution, which called the Judiciary Committee. That entity is being formed to conduct selections to the Supreme Court judge candidates and also to supervise the behaviour of the judges. But along the way, the Supreme Court judges felt that the Judiciary Committee’s supervision is interfering with the independency of the judges. Thus, the Supreme Court judges conducted a judicial review on the Law No. 22 of 2004 and Law No. 4 of 2004. After that, the Supreme Court issued Stipulation No. 05/PUU-IV/2006 with the following points verdicts: a) that constitutional judges are not included in the objects of Judiciary Committee’s supervision, because when the idea to form a judiciary committee occurred, the Constitutional Court itself was yet to be existed. Thus by this premise, the formation of the Judiciary Committee is meant to supervise the judges and the Supreme Court judges; b) Supreme Court judges are objects of Judiciary Committee’s supervision. This is in accordance with the primary purpose of the Judiciary Committee’s formation, which was to supervise the behavior of judges as well as Supreme Court judges; c) the material about the supervision is being annulled since it is not in accordance with the checks and balances principle. The Judiciary Committee is merely an auxiliary state organ which cannot supervise Supreme Court and Constitutional Court as the main state organ. The Constitutional Court Stipulation No. 05/PUU-IV/2006 has the potential to violate the principle of nemo judex idoneus in propria causa, which someone cannot act as a judge for himself.

Perbandingan Model Komisi Yudisial Republik Indonesia Dengan Komisi Yudisial Perancis Suparto, Suparto
UIR Law Review Vol 3 No 01 (2019): UIR Law Review
Publisher : UIR Press

The standing of the Judiciary Commitee, thus structurally it wascreated on the same level with the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court.Even so, the nature of the Judiciary Committee is an auxiliary to the judiciary bodies.Even if the function of the Judiciary Committee is related with Judiciary power, yet it is not the actor of the Judiciary power, but an institution to uphold the code of ethics. Aside from that, the Judiciary Committee is not involved in the organization, human resources, administration, and financial matters of the judges. This is different with the similar committees in the Europe, i.e. France. The France Council for Judiciary has the authority in the technical field as well as the policy making in the judiciary bodies. The judciary committees of the France and Europe in general has the authority in the management of the organization, budgeting, and administration of the courts, including on promotion, rotation, recruitment, and the giving of a sanction to the judges. The Supreme Court itself focuses on the trial conduct, and does not handles the administration and the organization of the court.

Pengujian UU No. 27 Tahun 2009 Dan UU No. 17 Tahun 2014 Tentang MPR, DPR, DPD & DPRD (MD3) Sebagai Upaya DPD Untuk Mengembalikan Kewenangan Konstitusionalnya Suparto Suparto
UIR Law Review Vol. 1 No. 1 (2017): UIR Law Review
Publisher : UIR Press

Dalam UU No. 27 Tahun 2009 Tentang MPR, DPR, DPD & DPRD (MD3) banyak kewenangan DPD yang tereduksi, sehingga DPD melakukan pengujian UU tersebut ke Mahkamah Konstitusi. Mahkamah Konstitusi melalui putusan No. 92/PUU-X/2012 mengembalikan kewenangan DPD sebagaimana yang diatur oleh UUD 1945. Namun demikian walaupun sudah ada putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 92/PUU-X/2012 akan tetapi dalam UU No. 17 Tahun 2014 Tentang MD3 yang merupakan pengganti dari UU No. 27 Tahun 2009, DPR kembali melanggarnya dengan mengabaikan putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi tersebut sehingga DPD akhirnya kembali mengajukan judicial review. Kemudian Mahkamah Konstitusi mengeluarkan putusan No. 79/PUU-XII/2014 yang mengembalikan lagi kewenanangan DPD, tetapi DPR tetap mengabaikannya dengan tidak mengakomodirnya dalam Tata Tertib (Tatib). Oleh karena itu kedepan DPR dan Presiden sebagai institusi negara yang mempunyai kewenangan untuk membentuk UU agar mematuhi dan menjalankan keputusan Mahkamah Konstitusi, karena bagaimanapun putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi itu adalah sama derajatnya dengan Undang-Undang. Kata kunci : Judicial Review, Kewenangan, DPD

Perlunya Pengawasan Terhadap Kode Etik Dan Perilaku Hakim Konstitusi Dalam Rangka Menjaga Martabat Dan Kehormatannya: The Need For Supervision On Constitutional Court Judges’ Code Of Ethics & Behavior In Order To Uphold Their Dignity And Honor Ellydar Chaidir; Suparto Suparto
UIR Law Review Vol. 1 No. 2 (2017): UIR Law Review
Publisher : UIR Press

In the beginning, the external supervision on Constitutional Court Judges’ ethics and behavior was conducted by Judicial Commission. That was in accordance with the stipulation in Law No. 22 of 2004 and Law No. 4 of 2004. Yet the activity of supervision itself has yet to be conducted, due to Constitutional Court Ruling No. 005/PUU-IV/2006, which stated that Constitutional Court Judges are not subject to Judicial Commission’s supervision. Hence, the supervision was conducted internally by Constitutional Court itself. After the issuance of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (“PERPU”) No. 1 of 2013 on Second Amendment to Law No. 24 of 2003 (Law No. 4 of 2014), the authority of external supervision was once again being held by Judicial Commission. But with Constitutional Court Ruling No. 1-2/PUU-XII/2014, the PERPU was once again being canceled. Hence, the supervision on the judges is conducted internally via the Board of Ethics of the Constitutional Court. In the future, Constitutional Court Judges must be supervised by external body, but without violating their independency as judges. Yet, since Constitutional Court as the interpreter of Constitution once interpret the scope of “judges” in article 24B (1) of 1945 Constitution are limited to the Judge and Supreme Court Justice (Not including Constitutional Court Judge), to be able to conduct an external supervision to them, a revision on article 24B (1) of 1945 Constitution needs to be conducted.

Perbandingan Model Komisi Yudisial Republik Indonesia Dengan Komisi Yudisial Perancis Suparto Suparto
UIR Law Review Vol. 3 No. 1 (2019): UIR Law Review
Publisher : UIR Press

The standing of the Judiciary Commitee, thus structurally it wascreated on the same level with the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court.Even so, the nature of the Judiciary Committee is an auxiliary to the judiciary bodies.Even if the function of the Judiciary Committee is related with Judiciary power, yet it is not the actor of the Judiciary power, but an institution to uphold the code of ethics. Aside from that, the Judiciary Committee is not involved in the organization, human resources, administration, and financial matters of the judges. This is different with the similar committees in the Europe, i.e. France. The France Council for Judiciary has the authority in the technical field as well as the policy making in the judiciary bodies. The judciary committees of the France and Europe in general has the authority in the management of the organization, budgeting, and administration of the courts, including on promotion, rotation, recruitment, and the giving of a sanction to the judges. The Supreme Court itself focuses on the trial conduct, and does not handles the administration and the organization of the court.

Interpreting The State's Right to Control In the provisions of Article 33 Paragraph (3), The Constitution of 1945 Republic of Indonesia Suparto Suparto
UIR Law Review Vol. 4 No. 2 (2020): UIR Law Review
Publisher : UIR Press

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.25299/uirlrev.2020.vol4(2).6889

Article 33 paragraph (3) of The Constitution Republic of Indonesia in 1945 stipulates that "Earth, water and natural resources contained therein controlled by the State and used for the people's welfare". Understanding of the earth (which is called land) according to the provisions of Article 1 paragraph (4) of Law Number 5 of 1960 concerning Basic Regulations on Basic Agrarian Issues is the surface of the earth and the body of the earth underneath it and which is under water. The meaning of the provisions of Article 33 paragraph (3) in The Constitution of 1945 is that the State as the highest power organization of all people (the nation) acts as the Governing Body. The right to control the State or be controlled by the State in this article does not mean "owned", but in the sense of giving authority to the State as the highest power organization of the Indonesian nation. The Constitutional Court elaborated State's Right to Control becomes 5 (five) authorities whose purpose is as much as possible for the prosperity of the people, including: (1). Formulate policy (beleid), (2). Make arrangements (regelendaad), (3). Carry out management (bestuurdaad), (4). Carry out management (beheerdaad), and (5). Supervise (toeichthoudensdaad). The earth, water and natural resources contained in the earth are the main points of people's prosperity, therefore they must be controlled by the State and used for the greatest prosperity of the people.

Perlunya Amandemen Terhadap Pasal 24 B Ayat (1) UUD 1945 Dalam Rangka Pengawasan Terhadap Hakim Konstitusi Suparto Suparto
Borneo Law Review Volume 4 No 1 Juni 2020
Publisher : Fakultas Hukum Universitas Borneo Tarakan

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.35334/bolrev.v4i1.1396

Abstrak Peran dari hakim konstitusi untuk menegakkan keadilan sangat strategis, oleh karena itudiperlukan hakim yang mempunyai sikap dan perilaku yang baik. Dengan demikian hakimkonstitusipun perlu dilakukan pengawasan terhadap perilakunya demi menjaga marwahinstitusi peradilan. Permasalahannya apa upaya yang dapat dilakukan agar pengawasaneksternal terhadap kode etik dan perilaku hakim konstitusi dilaksanakan oleh KomisiYudisial. Pengawasan yang bersifat eksternal terhadap hakim konstitusi saat ini belum adapengaturannya, sehingga dimasa mendatang perlu dilakukan karena secara profesi hakimkonstitusi sama dengan hakim-hakim yang lain. Komisi Yudisial sebagai lembaga negara hasilreformasi dan diberi kewenangan oleh UUD 1945 untuk menjaga dan menegakkankehormatan, keluhuran martabat dan perilaku hakim sudah selayaknya untuk diberikankewenangan untuk melakukan pengawasan eksternal terhadap perilaku hakim konstitusi.Namun demikian pengawasan terhadap hakim konstitusi jangan sampai mengintervensiindependensi peradilan sehingga perlu dicarikan formulasi yang tepat untuk mensinergikanantara pengawasan dengan independensi peradilan. Berhubung Pasal 24B ayat (1) terkaitkata ”hakim” ditafsirkan oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi bukan termasuk hakim konstitusi(Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 005/PUU-IV/2006 dan No.1-2/PUU-XII/2014, maka kedepan agar hakim konstitusi dapat diawasi oleh Komisi Yudisial, perlu dilakukan amandementerhadap Pasal 24B ayat (1) UUD 1945 terkait dengan kata ”hakim”. Kata Kunci : Pengawasan, Hakim Konstitusi, Amandemen UUD 1945AbstractThe role of constitutional justices to uphold justice is very strategic, therefore judges who havegood attitudes and behavior are needed. Thus, constitutional judges also need to supervise theirbehavior in order to maintain the dignity of judicial institutions. The problem is what efforts canbe made so that external supervision of the code of ethics and behavior of constitutional justicesis carried out by the Judicial Commission. External supervision of constitutional judges at thistime has not yet been regulated, so that in the future it needs to be done because professionallyconstitutional justices are the same as other judges. The Judicial Commission as a stateinstitution as a result of reforms and given the authority of the 1945 Constitution to maintainand uphold the honor, nobility and behavior of judges should be given the authority to conductexternal supervision of the behavior of constitutional justices. However, the supervision ofconstitutional justices should not intervene in the independence of the judiciary so that anappropriate formulation is needed to synergize between supervision and judicial independence.Since Article 24B paragraph (1) related to the word "judge" was interpreted by the Constitutional Court not including constitutional justices (Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 005 / PUU-IV / 2006 and No.1-2 / PUU-XII / 2014, then in the future so that Constitutional judges can be supervised by the Judicial Commission, amendments to Article 24B paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution are needed in connection with the word "judge".Keywords: Supervision, Constitutional Justice, Amendment to the 1945 Constitution

ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURT VERDICT NUMBER 14/PUU-XI/2013 ON THE PRESIDENTIAL THRESHOLD S Suparto
Jurnal Dinamika Hukum Vol 16, No 3 (2016)
Publisher : Faculty of Law, Universitas Jenderal Soedirman

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.20884/1.jdh.2016.16.3.523

In judicial review on Article 9 of Law No. 42 of 2008 on Election of President and Vice-President which regulates presidential threshold, the Constitutional Court declined it since it is an open legal policy mandated by Article 6 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution that the administration of President and Vice-President election will be further regulated in a Law. This reason is deemed insufficient as the Article 6 paragraph (5) regulates procedures (phases of the process), not requirements for candidates of President and Vice President to be eligible on participating in the election. Moreover, Article 9 of Law No. 42 of 2008 potentially expands the norms as stipulated in Article 6A paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution in which the candidates for President and Vice President shall be nominated by a political party or coalition of political parties participating in the election prior to the election without any other frills (the threshold).The term presidential threshold that is being used up until now is actually incorrect term; instead, presidential candidacy threshold should be considered as the more appropriate term.Keywords: Presidential Election, Presidential threshold, Constitutional Court Verdict.

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