Ahmad Imam Mawardi
Institut Agama Islam Negeri Sunan Ampel Surabaya

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Sisi Positif Taqlîd dalam Sejarah Perkembangan Hukum Islam Ahmad Imam Mawardi
Islamica: Jurnal Studi Keislaman Vol. 5 No. 2 (2011): Maret
Publisher : Postgraduate Studies of Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Ampel Surabaya, Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (90.08 KB) | DOI: 10.15642/islamica.2011.5.2.245-255

Abstract

The main problem that this paper is interested in dealing with is the notion of taqlid, the English translation of which being a blind acceptance. Taqlid is the opposite of Ijtihad, the intellectual exercise to draw certain legal rules from their sources. Muslims over centuries believed that taqlid in legal matters is not allowed, and that the door of Ijtihad has never been closed, as some Western scholars would emphatically argue. The paper nonetheless maintains that taqlid does take place in a major part of Islamic legal history. It has become unavoidable for Muslims to accept blindly ?due to some reasons- the legal views of the earlier scholars and jurists. But the paper also argues that to accept without question the views of the authoritative scholars in legal matters is not always bad. The paper tries to show that there are ?due to some conditions- positive things in committing Taqlid. To show this, the paper would attempt to scrutinize the historical facts in which Muslims do benefit from doing Taqlid. It means also that, Ijtihad is not always good for Muslims. By presenting some findings -the paper will argue- that in some cases, Muslims should abandon independent intellectual exercise and resort to blind acceptance if in doing so would bring benefit for them.
Qiyās dan Istiḥsān dalam Rasionalitas Uṣūl al-Sarakhsī Ahmad Imam Mawardi
Islamica: Jurnal Studi Keislaman Vol. 7 No. 1 (2012): September
Publisher : Postgraduate Studies of Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Ampel Surabaya, Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (258.679 KB) | DOI: 10.15642/islamica.2012.7.1.85-99

Abstract

There are two conceptual terms that this paper will try to expose. The first is analogy (qiyās) and the second is istiḥsān, an analogy?like method of extrapolating jurisprudential rules. The paper will try to speak of their relationship in the light of al-Sarakhsī's rationality. In the field of Islamic jurisprudence, the two concepts are often seen as contradicting to one another. The Shafiite jurists are even of belief that using istiḥsān is legally forbidden for that would contradict the general rules of Islamic law. The paper assumes that despite general view of the jurists that istiḥsān is an equivocal method it can nonetheless be fitted into qiyâs. To show that however, the paper would inevitably re-define both qiyās and istiḥsān as proposed by al-Sarakhs?. By exploiting the ideas of al-al-Sarakhsī, the paper hopes that new lights may be shed as far as the richness of Islamic method in jurisprudence is concerned.