Article Per Year (5 Year)
p-Index From 2019 - 2024
0
P-Index
This Author published in this journals
All Journal Fokus Ekonomi
Nurul Latifah Pancawardani
Dosen STIE Pelita Nusantara Semarang
Economics, Econometrics & Finance

Published : 2 Documents Claim Missing Document
Claim Missing Document
Check
Articles

Found 2 Documents
Search

 1 
PENGUKURAN KINERJA KEUANGAN PERUSAHAAN DENGAN METODE ANALISA CASH FLOW RATIO Nurul Latifah Pancawardani
Fokus Ekonomi : Jurnal Ilmiah Ekonomi Vol 4, No 2: Desember 2009
Publisher : STIE Pelita Nusantara Semarang

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.34152/fe.4.2.%p

Abstract

This paper will describe in a normative doctrinaire one alternative method performance measuring company is Cash flow Ratio Analysis . Attention with this Cash flow is very important because  the company in this operational have to attention talent to complete cash from the external of it. Cash flow is process in the inside there’s enter out Cash flow and in Cash flow effect of company operation. The company activities with Cash flow : 1) Cash flow from operating (CFFO) activities, 2) Cash flow from investing activities, 3) Cash flow from financing activities .
ADAKAH PERILAKU OPORTUNISTIK DALAM APLIKASI AGENCY THEORY DI SEKTOR PUBLIK? Nurul Latifah Pancawardani
Fokus Ekonomi : Jurnal Ilmiah Ekonomi Vol 5, No 2: Desember 2010
Publisher : STIE Pelita Nusantara Semarang

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.34152/fe.5.2.%p

Abstract

Implementation of regional autonomy in Indonesia based on Law 22/1999 and Law 25/1999. The implementation of regional autonomy opportunities application research agency theory in public budgeting. The legislature is a principal party to the executive but also as agent for Voters. The occurrence of asymmetry of information between the executive and legislative branches to be not of much value when the legislature uses discretionary powerin budgeting. Agents have more information about the actual performance, motivation, and purpose, potentially creating moral hazard and adverse selection. Principals themselves must pay (costs) to monitor agency performance and determine the structure of incentives andefficient monitoring. The existence of information asymmetry between executive-legislative and legislative-voter lead the opening of space for the occurrence of opportunistic behavior in the budgeting process.
Co-Authors