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All Journal Journal of International Conference Proceedings Indonesian Journal of Interdisciplinary Research in Science and Technology (MARCOPOLO)
Ayu Sasni Munte
Universitas Negeri Manado
Humanities Civil Engineering, Building, Construction & Architecture Decision Sciences, Operations Research & Management Education Electrical & Electronics Engineering Industrial & Manufacturing Engineering Languange, Linguistic, Communication & Media Social Sciences

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 1 
Observable Versus Unobservable Contracts in Duopolistic Competition Ayu Sasni Munte; Arie Kawulur
Journal of International Conference Proceedings (JICP) Vol 5, No 2 (2022): BEFIC Conference Proceeding
Publisher : AIBPM Publisher

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.32535/jicp.v5i2.1676

Abstract

One upstream and two downstream firms are involved in a vertically related industry. Under observable contracts, firms are aware of both their own and their rival's input prices. However, under an unobservable contract, firms only know their own input price and are unaware of their rival’s input price. We demonstrate both vertical separation and vertical integration in the two contracts. We focus on two methods: linear tariffs and two-part tariffs. With linear tariffs and asymmetric costs under both observable contracts and unobservable contracts, vertical integration increases consumer surplus and social welfare. With separation linear tariffs and asymmetric costs, consumer surplus (social welfare) is lower (higher) under observable contracts than under unobservable contracts. With two-part tariffs, vertical integration does not affect (decreases) both consumer surplus and social welfare under observable contracts (under unobservable contracts). Under separation two-part tariffs, consumer surplus and social welfare are lower under observable two-part tariffs than under unobservable ones. Keywords: Observable Contracts, Unobservable Contracts, Duopolistic Competition
Cross Ownership and Licensing Incentive Ayu Sasni Munte
Indonesian Journal of Interdisciplinary Research in Science and Technology Vol. 1 No. 4 (2023): May, 2023
Publisher : PT FORMOSA CENDEKIA GLOBAL

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.55927/marcopolo.v1i4.4317

Abstract

In a homogeneous good Cournot duopoly, a firm owns a cost-reducing technology and shares his ownership to its rival. We show that optimal output of firm 1 is lower under licensing than under no licensing but optimal output of firm 2 is higher under licencing than under no licensing. Superior firm will license its superior technology to firm 2 depends on how effective the technology is.
Co-Authors Arie Frits Kawulur