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Corporate Governance: Evidence from Firms Strategic Emphasis Majdi Anwar Quttainah
Journal of International Conference Proceedings (JICP) Vol 2, No 1 (2019): Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference of Project Management (ICPM) Bal
Publisher : AIBPM Publisher

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.32535/jicp.v2i1.414

Abstract

A firm’s ability to maintain competitiveness, comparative advantage, and long-term productivity growth depends crucially on its Strategic Emphasis (hereinafter; SE). By SE we mean the interaction between firms’ Value Creation and Value Appropriation activities. While Value Creation is based on innovating, producing and delivering products to the market, in contrast, Value Appropriation can be thought of as the extraction of profits by capitalizing on innovative and productive activities (Mizik & Jacobson, 2002). Being able to determine the SE of a firm, is an important factor in understanding the current nature of the firm, and where it is heading, based on the trade-off’s decision embedded within its SE. Despite its importance, very little is known about the role of Corporate Governance in strategic emphasis and the combined effect on firm performance. In this paper, we seek to fill this gap in the literature by providing a comprehensive analysis and new empirical evidence on the relations between CG as represented by the market for corporate control, a firm’s SE, and firm performance. We focus on market for corporate control because, as Mizik and Jacobson (2003) points out, a firm’s internal and external environments are key determinants of Value Creation and the value appropriation. Jensen and Meckling (1979) further demonstrated that the market for corporate control is one of the most important components of a firm’s external environment. Market for corporate control refers to a takeover market where the underperforming or undervalued firms become attractive takeover targets. Hostile takeovers are regarded as one of the harshest forms of managerial discipline and usually result in a subsequent loss of wealth for these managers (Heath & Norman, 2004). As a result of the threat of hostile takeovers, publicly traded firms may be more willing to act in the interest of shareholders. This happens when the internal governance mechanism (board of directors) fails. When firms perform poorly, it often indicates that there was poor internal governance and therefore external governance control takes over. The market for corporate control allows shareholders to discipline the management of the firm. Shareholders usually favor a high-performing firm that can maintain its competitiveness, comparative advantage, and long-term productivity growth and are more likely to exercise their influence over the management of firms that do not demonstrate these characteristics (Anabtawi & Stout, 2007). Although capital markets pressure top managers to focus on short-term projects and neglect innovation (Holmstrom, 1989), innovation is a major driver of economic growth (Solow, 1957; Romer,1990). Thus, this paper attempts to answer the questions: (1) To what extent does the market for corporate control affect a firm’s SE decision? (2) Given that the market for corporate control pressures managers, to what extent does it impact the firm’s allocated resources between VC and value appropriation? We hypothesize that the market for corporate control determines and impacts the intensity of the se increase whether on value appropriation or VC and what influence this direction. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides related theory development, literature review and hypotheses development. Section 3 describes our data and variable construction. Section 4 describes the methodology. Section 5 discusses our main results, endogeneity concerns and robustness checks. Section 6 provides recommendations for further research and conclusion.
Co-Authors Abdulaziz Al Shuwaler Abhishek Singh Abishek Singh Aditi Srivastava Adnan Abbas Alqallaf Ahmad Al Fahad Ahmad AlFahad Ahmad Amer Aafis Mohamed Ali Aisha Bader Alotaibi Ala' Odeh Anfal Alrashidi Ankit Gupta Annis Afifah Arti Bella Ashutosh Verma Asla Alosaimi Basyeerah Basyeerah Bilqis Salwa Nabila ri Chia Miin Low Chin Kah Hui Chiu Yin Wee Choo Mun Kei Ch’ng Kelvin Daisy Mui Hung Kee Daisy Mui Hung Kee Deepali Verma Er Jia Qi Ewe Cai Wen Farra Shameen Lim Fatimah Al Rashidi Fay Fahad Alfahad Friday Ogbu Edeh Gao Qu Gayathiri A/P Ravindran Geethanapriya A/P Sathiyananthan Ghezlan Al Basis Ghezlan Albesis Guan Hong Wong Hadeel Al Shammari Hadeel Alhamlan Hala Soud Alrashidi Hamad Alfadhly Hui San Yap Hussain Alajmi Intan Junaina Ishwari A/P Ravindran Jia Yee Lin Jigyasa Jayant Joel Chen Tai Soon Kajal Vashishth Kejian Wu Khadija Mohammad Ahmad Khai Lyn Teoh Khalifa Abdulaziz Zayed Kim Fong Wong Koh Jhee Qing Latifa Alobaidan Liem Gai Sin Linarani A/P Muniandy Mahtab Soleimani Mariam Ben Saif Mei Theng Woh Ming Yuen Siw Minli Wu Mohd Azri Hanif Muhamad Amir Zakwan Muhamad Hanif Muhamad Syafiq Muhammad Adam Muhammad Afifi Muskan Saxena Nabilah Maisarah Nur Amirah Nur Aqilah Nur Fadhilah Nur Fatin Nafiessa Nurhafizah Kamilah Nurul Syakirah Nurul Uwais Obaja Elka Kurniawan Pei Huei Tan Preethi A. Prakash Pusparajan A/L Antony Das Puteri Fatimah Zahra Qishen Huang Ranjith P.V Rashed Fahad Almuhaini Rudresh Pandey Rudresh Pandey Rui Suen Ong Saba AlFouzan Sarah Rifhani Shaidatul Aina Shashi Gupta Shu Ting Wang Siti Syafiqah Izni Shafiee Sonia Shukla Sourav Basak Syafiqah Mohd Zamri Syarifah Nurdzamanisya Syed Badrulzaman Tahreem Tariq Mahmud Thiam Yong Kuek Victory Chinelo Awoke Wanneyda Suvanmanee Xin Yun Ng Yashwiny Narayanan YiYe Wang Yung Ting Wong Zhen Yang Jin Zhi Wei Lee Zi Ling Ang